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In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, 
in a world with only one preference profile.  This theorem relies on a new assumption of 
preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.   
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1.  Introduction. 
  In 1950 Kenneth Arrow (1950, 1963) provided a striking answer to a basic 
abstract problem of democracy:  how can the preferences of many individuals be 
aggregated into social preferences?  The answer, which has come to be known as 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, was that every conceivable aggregation method has some 
flaw.  That is, a handful of reasonable-looking axioms, which one hopes an aggregation 
procedure would satisfy, lead to impossibility:  the axioms are mutually inconsistent.  
The impossibility theorem created a large literature and major field called social choice 
theory; see for example,  Suzumura’s (2002) Introduction to the Handbook of Social 
Choice and Welfare, and  Campbell and Kelly (2002) in the same volume.  The theorem 
has also had a major influence on the larger fields of economics and political science, as 
well as on distant fields like mathematical biology.  (See, e.g., Bay and McMorris 
(2003).) 
Single-profile versions of Arrow’s theorem, in which there is just one profile of 
individual preferences, were devised in response to an argument of Paul Samuelson 
(1967) against Arrow.   Samuelson claimed that Arrow’s model, with varying preference 
profiles, is irrelevant to the problem of maximizing a Bergson-Samuelson-type social 
welfare function (Bergson (1938)), which depends on a given set of ordinal utility 
functions, that is, a fixed preference profile.  But single-profile Arrow theorems 
established that bad results (dictatorship, or illogic of social preferences, or, more 
generally, impossibility of aggregation) could be proved with one fixed preference profile 
(or set of ordinal utility functions), provided the profile is “diverse” enough.  (See Parks 
  1(1976), Hammond (1976), Kemp and Ng (1976), Pollak (1979), Roberts (1980), and 
Rubinstein (1984).) 
This paper has two purposes.  The first is to provide a short and transparent 
single-profile version of Arrow’s theorem.  In addition to being short and simple, our 
proof, unlike earlier proofs, does not require the existence of large numbers of 
alternatives.  Our second and related purpose is to explore the meaning of preference 
profile diversity.  In our theorem we will use a diversity assumption, which we call 
diversity under minimal decisiveness (D.M.D.), that is much weaker than the 
assumptions used by other authors.  D.M.D. requires information about the social 
preference relation in order to be well defined; this makes it similar to other assumptions 
used in the theorem (e.g., Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, no dictator), but different from 
earlier diversity assumptions.  Its great advantage is that it is “almost necessary” for the 
impossibility result.  In fact we offer a near-converse to our impossibility theorem: if 
there is a dictator, D.M.D. must hold. 
In single-profile models, Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption is vacuous (independence requires consistency as preference profiles are 
varied), and neutrality, or its stronger variant neutrality/monotonicity, takes its place 
(neutrality requires consistency as alternative pairs are varied within a fixed preference 
profile).  We use the stronger neutrality/monotonicity assumption in our theorem. 
Recent related literature includes Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005), who argue for 
returning to the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function framework, Geanakoplos 
(2005), who has three very elegant proofs of Arrow’s theorem in the standard multi-
profile context, and Ubeda (2004), who has another elegant multi-profile proof.  The 
  2proofs of Geanakoplos and Ubeda, while short, are mathematically more challenging than 
ours.  Ubeda also emphasizes the importance of (multi-profile) neutrality, somewhat 
similar to the (single-profile) neutrality/monotonicity assumption we use in this paper, 
and much stronger than Arrow’s independence, and he provides several theorems 
establishing neutrality’s equivalence to other intuitively appealing principles.  Reny 
(2001) has an interesting side-by-side pair of (multi-profile) proofs, of Arrow’s theorem 
and the related theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite.   
 
2.  The Model. 
  We assume a society with   individuals, and 3 or more alternatives.   2 ≥ n
 A specification of the preferences of all individuals is called a preference profile.  In our 
theorem there is only one preference profile.  The preference profile is transformed into a 
social preference relation.  Both the individual and the social preference relations allow 
indifference.  The individual preference relations are all assumed to be complete and 
transitive.  The following notation is used:  Generic alternatives are x, y, z, w, etc.  
Particular alternatives are a, b, c, d, etc.  A generic person is labeled i, j, k and so on; a 
particular person is 1, 2, 3, and so on.  Person i’s preference relation is Ri.  xRiy means 
person i prefers x to y or is indifferent between them; xPiy means i prefers x to y; xIiy 
means i is indifferent between them.  Society’s preference relation is R.  xRy means 
society prefers x to y or is indifferent between them; xPy means society prefers x to y;  xIy 
means society is indifferent between them.  We will start with a list of relevant 
assumptions: 
 
  3(1)  Complete and transitive social preferences.  The social preference relation 
R is complete and transitive.  
(2)  Pareto principle.  For all x and y, if xPiy for all i, then xPy. 
(3)  Neutrality/monotonicity.  Suppose the support for w over z is as strong or 
stronger than the support for x over y, and suppose the opposite support, for z over 
w, is as weak or weaker than the support for y over x.   Then, if the social 
preference is for x over y, the social preference must also be for w over z.  More 
formally:  For all x, y, z, and w, assume that for all i, xPiy implies wPiz, and that 
for all i, zPiw implies yPix.  Then xPy implies wPz. 
(4)  No dictator.  Individual i is a dictator if, for all x and y, xPiy implies xPy.  
There is no dictator. 
(5.a)  Simple diversity (S.D.).  There exists a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such 
that xPiy for all i, but opinions are split on x vs. z, and on y vs. z.  That is, some 
people prefer x to z and some people prefer z to x, and, similarly, some people 
prefer y to z and some people prefer z to y.   
 
Note that our Pareto assumption is what is often called the “weak Pareto” 
principle.  Note also that we are using the neutrality/monotonicity assumption for our 
theorem, rather than a weaker assumption of neutrality.  (Blau & Deb (1977), call the 
multi-profile analog of assumption 3 “full neutrality and monotonicity”; Sen (1977) calls 
it NIM; and Pollak (1979) calls it “nonnegative responsiveness.”)  Simple diversity, 
assumption 5.a, is so numbered because we will introduce an alternative later.  Observe 
  4that S.D. is similar to previous diversity assumptions in the literature, in the sense that its 
definition is independent of the social preference relation. 
Note that the no dictator property is slightly different in the single-profile world 
from what it is in a multi-profile world.  For example, in the single-profile world, if all 
individuals have the same preferences, and if weak Pareto holds, then by definition 
everyone is a dictator.  Or, if individual i is indifferent among all the alternatives, he is by 
definition a dictator.  So in the single-profile world a dictator may be innocuous.  But, if 
preferences are diverse enough, and indifference is limited enough, dictatorship remains 
objectionable, even in this world.  
 
3.  Some Examples. 
  We will illustrate with a few simple examples.  For these there are 2 or more 
people and 3 or more alternatives, and we assume no individual indifference between any 
pair of alternatives.  Preferences of the people are shown by listing the alternatives from 
top (most preferred) to bottom (least preferred).  In our examples, the last column of the 
table shows what is being assumed about society’s preferences.  The comment below 
each example indicates which desired property is breaking down.  The point of examples 
1 through 5, in which  , is that if we are willing to discard any one of the five basic 
assumptions 1 through 5.a, the remaining 4 may be mutually consistent.  But if we insist 
on all 5, we get an Arrow impossibility result.
2 n =
1  The point of example 6 is that, when 
, assumptions 1 through 5.a may actually be consistent, with no Arrow  3 n =
                                                 
1 In Feldman and Serrano (2006b) we provide a very simple version of Arrow’s theorem, for the   
case, based on assumptions 1 through 5.a. 
2 n =
  5impossibility.  Example 6 therefore shows that the S.D. assumption must be modified if 
we are to get an impossibility result when  .  2 n >
 
 
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(Majority Rule)
Example 1  a c   
  b  a  aPb, aIc & bIc 
  c b   
Breakdown:  Transitivity for social preferences fails.  Transitivity for R implies 
transitivity for I.  This means aIc & cIb should imply aIb.  But we 
have aPb. 
  Person 1 Person 2 Society
Example 2  a c   
  b a  aIbIc 
  c b   
Breakdown: Pareto  fails,  because  aP1b & aP2b should imply aPb.  But we have 
aIb. 
  Person 1 Person 2 Society
Example 3  a c  a 
  b a  c 
  c b  b 
Breakdown: Neutrality/monotonicity  fails.   Compare the social treatment of a vs. 
c, where the two people are split and person 1 gets his way, to the 
social treatment of b vs. c, where the two people are split and person 
2 gets his way. 
 
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(1 is Dictator)
Example 4  a c  a 
  b a  b 
  c b  c 
Breakdown:  Person 1 is a dictator. 
  6 
Note that examples 1 through 4 all use the same profile of individual preferences, 
which satisfies the S.D. assumption.  Example 5 modifies the individual preferences so 
that S.D. no longer holds.  With S.D. dropped, majority rule works fine. 
 
Person 1 Person 2
Society 
(Majority Rule)
Example 5  a c   
  c a aIc 
  b b  aPb & cPb 
Breakdown:  S.D. fails.  Opinions are no longer split over two pairs of 
alternatives. 
 
  In example 6 we start with the same individual preferences as in examples 1 
through 4, and we add a 3
rd person and a 4
th alternative.  Now assumptions 1 through 5.a 
are all satisfied.  So with   and S.D., there may be no Arrow impossibility.  2 n >
 
Person 1 Person 2 Person 3
Society 
(Majority Rule)
Example 6  a c a  a 
  b a c  c 
  c b  d  b 
  d d  b  d 
Breakdown:  None.  The complete and transitive social preferences assumption is 
satisfied, as are Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, S.D., and no 
dictator.  Majority rule works fine.  There is no Arrow impossibility. 
 
 
4.  Diversity. 
  In this section we will modify the diverse preferences assumption. 
  7  Before doing so, let’s consider the assumption when n = 2.   When there are only 
two people, S.D. says there must exist a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xPiy for i = 
1, 2, but such that opinions are split on x vs. z and on y vs. z.  That is, one person prefers x 
to z, while the other prefers z to x, and one person prefers y to z, while the other prefers z 
to y.  Given our assumption that individual preferences are transitive, it must be the case 
that the two people’s preferences over the triple can be represented as follows: 
Simple diversity (S.D.) array, n = 2.  





Note that this is exactly the preference profile pattern of examples 1, 2, 3 and 4.   The 
preferences in this table are two thirds of the Condorcet voting paradox preferences, as 
shown below: 
Condorcet voting paradox array. 
Person i Person j  Person k
x z y 
y x z 
z y x 
   
A similar array of preferences is used by Arrow in the proof of his impossibility 
theorem (e.g. Arrow (1963), p. 58), and by many others since, including us (Feldman & 
Serrano (2006a), p. 294).  For the moment, assume V is any non-empty set of people in 
society, that V
C is the complement of V, and that V is partitioned into two non-empty 
  8subsets V1 and V2.  (Note that V
C  may be empty.)  The standard preference array used in 
many versions of Arrow’s theorem looks like this: 
Standard Arrow array. 
People in V1 People in V2 People  in  V
C
x z  y 
y x  z 
z y  x 
 
Now, let’s return to the question of how to modify the diverse preferences 
assumption.  Example 6 shows that we cannot stick with the S.D. array and still get an 
impossibility result.  We might start with the Condorcet voting paradox array, but if 
, we would have to worry about the preferences of people other than i,  j and k.  
That suggests using something like the standard Arrow array.  However, assuming the 
existence of a triple x, y, and z, and preferences as per that array, for every subset of 
people V and every partition of V, is an unnecessarily strong diversity assumption. 
4 ≥ n
An even stronger diversity assumption was in fact used by Parks (1976), Pollak 
and other originators of single-profile Arrow theorems.  Pollak (1979) is clearest in his 
definition.  His condition of “unrestricted domain over triples” requires the following:  
Imagine “any logically possible sub-profile” of individual preferences over 3 
“hypothetical” alternatives x, y and z.  Then there exist 3 actual alternatives a, b and c for 
which the sub-profile of preferences exactly matches that “logically possible sub-profile” 
over x, y and z.   We will call this Pollak diversity.  Let us consider what this assumption 
requires in the simple world of strict preferences, 2 people, and 3 alternatives.  Pollak 
  9diversity would require that every one of the following arrays be represented, somewhere 
in the actual preference profile of the two people over the actual alternatives: 
Pollak diversity arrays, n = 2.  
1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2     1 2  
x x  x  x  x  y  x  y  x z  x z 
y y  y  z  y  x  y z  y  x  y  y 
z  z    z y   z z    z x   z y    z x 
   
Note that the number of arrays in the table above is 3! = 6.  If n were equal to 3 
we would have triples of columns instead of pairs, and there would have to be (3!)
2 = 36 
such triples.  With n people, the number of required n-tuples of columns would be (3!)
n-1.    
In short, the number of arrays required for Pollak diversity rises exponentially with n.  
The number of alternatives (which is larger that the number of arrays) rises with the 
number of required arrays, although not as fast because of array overlaps.  Parks (1976) 
uses an assumption (“diversity in society”) that is very similar to Pollak’s, although not 
so clear, and he indicates that it “requires at least 3
n alternatives...”  
We believe Pollak diversity is much stronger than necessary, and we will proceed 
as follows.  We will not assume the existence of a triple x, y and z to give every 
conceivable array of preferences on that triple.  We will not even assume a triple x, y and 
z to give every possible array for given V, V1, V2, and V
C, as per the description of the 
standard Arrow array.  We will only assume the existence of the required Arrow-type 
triple, and we will only assume that much when the Arrow array matters.  For the 
purposes of our proof, the Arrow array assumption only matters if V is a decisive set of 
minimal size, and if it has 2 or more members. 
  10We say that a set of people V is decisive if it is non-empty and if, for all 
alternatives x and y, if xPiy for all i in V, then xPy.  V is a minimally sized decisive set if 
there is no decisive set of smaller cardinality. 
It is appropriate to make a few comments about the notion of decisiveness.  First, 
note that if person i is a dictator, then i by himself is a minimally sized decisive set, 
although without 2 or more members, and any set strictly containing i is also decisive, but 
not minimally sized.  Also, note that the Pareto principle implies the set of all people is 
decisive.  Second, in a multi-preference profile world, decisiveness for V would be a far 
stronger assumption that it is in the single-profile world, since it would require that (the 
same) V prevail no matter how preferences might change.  We only require that V prevail 
under the given fixed preference profile. 
Our diversity assumption is now modified as follows: 
 
(5.b)  Diversity under minimal decisiveness (D.M.D.).  For any minimally-sized 
decisive set V with 2 or more members, there exists a triple of alternatives x, y, z, 
such that xPiy for all i in V; such that yPiz and zPix for everyone outside of V; and 
such that V can be partitioned into non-empty subsets V1 and V2, where the 
members of V1 all put z last in their rankings over the triple, and the members of 
V2 all put z first in their rankings over the triple. 
 
The assumption of D.M.D. means that for any minimally-sized decisive set V with 
2 or more members, there is a triple x, y, and z, and a partition of V, which produces 
exactly the standard Arrow array shown above. 
  11It’s appropriate to make a few comments about this definition of preference 
diversity.  First, unlike other definitions of diversity, it requires information about the 
induced social preference relation.  This is a disadvantage, because it makes the 
determination of diversity more complex; it no longer suffices to look at individual 
preferences to determine whether or not diversity is satisfied.  But it is not a logical 
problem, and in fact assumptions 1 through 4 (including Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, 
and no dictator) also require information about the induced social preference relation.  
Second, it is obviously implied by Pollak diversity but not vice versa.  Third, it requires 
the existence of far fewer alternatives than Pollak diversity; for instance, with  , we 
can easily construct a D.M.D. example with just 3 alternatives (see the comments 
following example 7 below).  Fourth, when 
3 n =
2 n = , S.D. and D.M.D. are equivalent, 
provided the Pareto and no dictator assumptions hold.  Fifth, in some contexts D.M.D. 
may be easier to determine than one might think; for instance, if one is analyzing 
majority rule, one can start the search for minimally-sized decisive sets by examining 
majority coalitions.
2   Sixth and finally, a very important advantage of the diversity under 
minimal decisiveness definition is that is just strong enough to get the desired 
impossibility result.  
  Referring back to example 6 of the previous section, consider persons 2 and 3.  
Under simple majority rule, which was assumed in the example, they constitute a 
decisive coalition.  They are a coalition of 2 or more members.  They are a minimally-
sized decisive coalition, because there is no dictator.  However the D.M.D. assumption  
                                                 
2 In a recent paper, Bossert and Suzumura (2007) characterize “consistent” preference aggregation 
procedures in a multi-profile world.  They provide a theorem showing an aggregation procedure has a list 
of attractive properties if and only if it counts numbers of people who prefer x to y, and who prefer y to x, 
and those counts satisfy certain simple inequalities.  Such a counting rule may help identify minimally-
sized decisive sets. 
  12fails in that example, because there is no way to define the triple x, y, z so as to get the 
standard Arrow array, when  V1  = {2}, V2 = {3}, and V
C  = {1}.  Therefore D.M.D. 
excludes example 6. 
  Example 7 below modifies example 6 to make it consistent with D.M.D..  (This 
example is created from example 6 by switching alternatives a and b in person 3’s 
ranking.)  Now that preferences have been modified to satisfy our new diversity 
assumption, an Arrow-type impossibility pops up. 
 
Person 1 Person  2 Person  3 
Society 
(Majority Rule) 
Example 7  a c b   
  b  a  c  aPb, bPc, cPa 
  c  b  d  aPd, bPd, cPd 
  d d  a   
Breakdown: Transitivity  for  social preferences fails, with a P cycle among 
a,b,c . 
 
Example 7 could be further modified by dropping alternative d, in which case it would 
become the Condorcet voting paradox array.  It would then have 3 people and 3 
alternatives, and would satisfy D.M.D..  Recall that Pollack diversity in the 3 person case 
would require at least 36 n-tuples of alternatives, and that Parks diversity would require 
at least   alternatives.  The point is that that D.M.D. requires many fewer 




5.  Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem. 
  13We now proceed to a proof of our single-profile Arrow’s theorem.
3  Although 
Pollak made a much stronger diversity assumption than we use, and although Parks 
(1976), Hammond (1976), and Kemp and Ng (1976), preceded Pollak with single-profile 
Arrow theorems, we will call this the Arrow/Pollak impossibility theorem, because of the 
similarity of our proof to his.  But first we need the following:  
  
Proposition:  Assume neutrality/monotonicity.  Assume there is a non-empty 
group of people V and a pair of alternatives x and y, such that xPiy for all i in V 
and yPix for all i not in V.  Suppose that xPy.  Then V is decisive. 
Proof:  Let  w and z be any pair of alternatives.  Assume wPiz for all i in V.  We 
need to show that wPz must hold.  This follows immediately from 
neutrality/monotonicity.  QED.  
 
Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem:  The assumptions of complete and 
transitive social preferences, Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, diversity under 
minimal decisiveness, and no dictator are mutually inconsistent. 
Proof:  By the Pareto principle, the set of all individuals is decisive.  Therefore 
decisive sets exist.  Let V be a decisive set of minimal size, that is, a decisive set 
with no proper subsets that are also decisive.  We will show that there is only one 
person in V, which will make that person a dictator.  This will establish Arrow’s 
theorem. 
  Suppose to the contrary that V has 2 or more members.  By the diverse-2 
                                                 
3 We have a similar proof for a multi-profile Arrow’s theorem in Feldman & Serrano (2006a). 
  14preferences assumption there is a triple of alternatives x, y, and z, and a partition 
of V into non-empty subsets V1 and V2, giving the standard Arrow array as shown 
above.  Since V is decisive, it must be true that xPy.  Next we consider the social 
preference for x vs. z. 
  Case 1.  Suppose zRx.  Then zPy by transitivity.  Then V2 becomes 
decisive by the proposition above.  But this is a contradiction, since we assumed 
that V was a decisive set of minimal size. 
  Case 2.  Suppose not zRx.  Then the social preference must be xPz, by 
completeness.  But in this case V1 is getting its way in the face of opposition by 
everyone else, and by the proposition above V1 is decisive, another contradiction.  
QED. 
 
Examples 1 through 4, and 7, show that the assumptions used in the theorem are 
all essential.  Also note that this theorem can be put in the following way:  Assume 
complete and transitive social preferences, Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, and D.M.D..  
Then there is a dictator. 
Given our definition of D.M.D., we have an easy “near converse”: 
 
Dictatorship/Diversity Near Converse:  Assume there is a dictator. Then the 
diversity under minimal decisiveness assumption is satisfied. 
Proof:  If there is a dictator, then there are no minimally sized decisive sets which 
have 2 or more members.  Therefore D.M.D. is vacuously satisfied.  QED. 
 
  15  In conclusion, we have presented a new, simple and transparent single-profile 
Arrow impossibility theorem.  The theorem relies on an assumption about diversity of 
preferences within the given profile that is much weaker than the assumptions used by 
other authors, that is close to necessary for the result, and that produces impossibility 
even when the number of alternatives is small.
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